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ministrator. Upon the murderer's death, the whole of the property would devolve
to the victim's administrator or heirs. The result here is essentially that achieved
by impressing a constructive trust on the property (at least where the decedent's
expectancy exceeded the survivor's), but the rationale again seems less convincing.
It is obvious from the foregoing that appropriate legislation is needed to create
order out of the chaoic state in which the law finds itself when cases such as the
National City Bank of Evansville v. Bledsoe anse. A model act sufficiently in-
clusive to cover most situations of this nature has been suggested. 3 3 However, in
jurisdictions which have not passed on the question, the absence of such legisla-
tion should not be fatal to the cause of the victim's estate. The court in Vesey v.
Veseys4 summed up what appears to be the better approach when it said, after
recognizing the desirability of statutory coverage:
" .[Blut until the legislature acts, this court can, by imposing a constructive trust,
prevent the repugnant result that one joint owner ... may take the whole . by
right of survivorship after feloniously causing the death of the other joint owner."3 5
The justice in this position seems irresistible. It is a solution which obviates
the harsh consequence flowing from the formalistic approach in the principal case
and revitalizes a legal maxim, familiar to even the most uninitiated layman, that
crime does not (or at least should not) pay.
Leo Andrade
TORTS: EXTENSION OF STANDARD OF REASONABLE CARE AS APPLIED TO
STORE OwiNMs
Snow has fallen for 25 to 30 minutes. A woman leaves a bus, walks a block and
a half over wet sidewalks; as she enters a store she slips on the wet terrazzo sur-
face of the entrance and is injured. She says she noticed the surface was wet, but
had no thought of its being slick. She was wearing pumps with 3Y2 inch heels, the
tips of which were worn so that the nails came into contact with the ground.
On these facts, should the court allow the question of the store owner's negli-
gence to go to the jury? The Supreme Court of Utah answered this question in
the affirmative in De Weese v. J. C. Penney Company.'
Few personal injury situations result in as many lawsuits as those in which an
invitee slips on the floor of a store or other business house. A large store or busi-
ness house has resources substantial enough to make it an attractive defendant in
an injury suit. Although the store's liability should be based solely on negligence or
other wrong, the wealth of the defendant, often known to the jury, creates a dan-
ger difficult to guard against. As a safeguard, a trial court, before it will let a jury
pass upon a defendant's liability, must determine that upon the facts stated a
reasonable man could find a basis for imposing such liability.2 An Ohio court em-
phasized the necessity for this rule m J C. Penney Co., Inc. v. Robison:3 "under
our law it is just as pernicious to submit a case to a jury and permit the jury to
8
3 Wade, note 29 supra. Compare CArF. PROBATE CODE § 258. This section, as drafted,
does not appear to adequately cover the problem under discussion.
84 237 Minn. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385 (1952).
35 237 Minn. at 302, 54 N.W.2d at 389.
15 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (1956).
2 65 CJ.S., Negligence, § 251 (1950).
3 J. C. Penney Co., Inc. v. Robison, 128 Ohio St. 626, 193 N.E. 401 (1934).
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speculate with the rights of citizens when no question for the jury is involved, as
it is to deny to a citizen his trial by jury when he has the right." A trial judge must
decide, then, which fact situations, as a matter of law, entitle the jury to pass upon
the defendant's liability. He looks, of course, to the numerous decisions which
have fashioned the case law on this point.
There are, it is believed, no decisions that a jury question is involved where
nothing more appears than that the plaintiff slipped on a dry surface of wood,
terrazzo, marble or other commonly used material. And with few exceptions, one
of which is the subject of this note,4 the courts deny that a jury question is pre-
sented where persons have fallen on floors made slippery by the presence of water
deposited by storm.5 This denial is summarized in 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 81:
"The fact that water, slush and mud are tracked in on the floor of premises because
of weather conditions outside does not ordinarily create an actionable situation,
although the floor is thereby rendered slippery."
In S. S. Kresge Co. v. Fader6 it is stated that store owners "are not insurers
against all forms of accidents ...Everyone knows that the hallways . . .are
tracked all over by the wet feet of people coming from the wet sidewalks, and are
therefore rendered more slippery than they otherwise would be.. ." In Lander v.
Sears Roebuck and Co.1 a directed verdict for the defendants was upheld be-
cause there was no evidence that the floor on which plaintiff fell was more slippery
than floors generally under the prevailing weather conditions. A glance at other
decisions quickly shows that, while almost unanimously denying that a jury ques-
tion exists, the courts give varying reasons: the danger is as perceptible to the in-
jured invitee as to the owner; 8 the customer has assumed the risk;9 a reasonable
person is charged with knowledge that a wet floor is more slippery than a dry
one;10 the customer may have tracked into the store the very moisture which
cause her to slip and fall."
If but one factor is added, however, to increase the hazard to the customer, a
great majority of the courts hold that a jury question exists.12 In the following sit-
uations the jury was allowed to consider the liability of the owner: a surface in-
sufficiently lighted ; 13 an inherent tendency of the floor to become excessively
slippery when wet, the tendency being unknown to the plaintiff; 14 dampness
caused by the act of the defendant or his servant.'r Also generally held to present
a jury question, are those situations in which oil, food or other slick substance has
been deposited on the floor.' 6 In such cases, because of the greater likelihood of
non-discovery of the peril by the customer, the jury is permitted to consider
4 Clark v. Lansburgh & Br., 75 App. D.C., 339, 127 F.2d 331 (1942). This decision is in
accord with the principal case, although not cited therein.
5 Annot., 118 A.L.R. 425 (1939).
6 116 Ohio St. 718, 158 N.E. 174 (1927).
7 141 Me. 422, 44 A. 2d 886 (1945).
STouhy v. Owl Drug Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d 64, 44 P.2d 405 (1935).
9 Dahnke v. Hunt, 55 Ohio App. 44, 8 N.E. 2d 838 (1936).
10 Neuber v. Royal Realty Co., 86 Cal. App. 2d 596, 195 P.2d 501 (1948).
11Neil v. Bank of America, 102 A.C.A. 179, 104 P.2d 107 (1940).
12 118 A.L.R. 425 (1939).
13 Chittum v. Joseph, 10 Il1. App. 2d 491, 135 N.E. 2d 120 (1956).
14 Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 31, 232 P.2d 210 (1951).
15 Hechler v. McDonnell, 42 Cal. App. 2d 515, 109 P.2d 426 (1941).
16 See note 5 supra.
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